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Abstract: In this paper we study how the use of resources in the public sector affects 
industrial structure, the size and the productivity in knowledge-intensive clusters in local 
communities.  We also discuss how these considerations should be implemented in cost-
benefit assessments of local public goods supply.  The topics are studied in a setting where 
there are gains from agglomeration in knowledge-intensive industries, creating clusters of 
firms in such industries.  We find that the primary effect is a Rybczynski effect: If production 
in the public sector is knowledge-intensive, the size of the knowledge-intensive private 
industry declines when the public sector increases its production.  If, on the other hand, public 
sector production uses relatively much unskilled labour, increased public goods production 
leads to higher production in the knowledge-intensive private industries. Private sector 
productivity is affected in the same way as production: If production in the knowledge-
intensive industry increases, so does its productivity due to agglomeration effects; leading to 
higher wages for highly skilled labour.    
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper studies how the use of resources for public sector purposes affects the size, 
structure and productivity in the private sector of the economy.  There is concern in many 
countries and local communities that public sector activities may crowd out important private 
sector firms and industries.  Some observers and policy-makers, however, argue that public 
sector jobs may be complementary to private-sector employment, and accordingly that a large 
public sector, properly designed, can have positive effects on the size and productivity of the 
private sector.  The purpose of the paper is to study the interaction between crowding-out and 
possible complementarities in a setting where there are agglomeration gains in the private 
sector. 
 
The analysis is relevant in several contexts.  One is the effects related to the problems of an 
ageing population.  Many people fear that the ageing of populations that we are witnessing in 
a range of countries - illustrated by the old-age dependency ratios in figures 1 and 2 - could 
have a negative effect on industrial productivity.  Undoubtedly, as people grow older they 
require more care and health services.  Many, in fact most, of these services are publicly 
provided and so an aging population implies a larger public sector.  Estimations show that 
public employment in the Norwegian health sector will more than double between 2020 and 
2060 (V.O. Nielsen (2008)).  Without growth in the labour stock, increased public sector 
employment leads to decreased private sector employment.  If this reduces industrial 
productivity, an ageing population is indeed a threat to industrial productivity. 
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Figure 1: Projected old-age dependency ratio in the EU and the Nordic countries1 (Eurostat) 
 
 
Figure 22: Projected old-age dependency ratio in the EU and the Nordic countries (Eurostat) 
 
                                                 
1 The Nordic countries: Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. 
2 From left to right the countries are Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Estonia, Ireland, 
Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Hungary, Malta, the Netherlands, Austria, 
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Finland, Sweden, UK, Norway, Switzerland, the EU 
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Another relevant context is that of regional policy.  It is sometimes argued3 that local govern-
ments should try to foster knowledge-intensive industrial agglomerations by establishing 
more public jobs for highly educated individuals – the presumption being that this will attract 
more highly educated people to the region and thus benefit the private sector as well.   
 
The paper shows that the intuition is wrong in both cases.  If care for the elderly is intensive 
in the use of low-skilled labour, growth in public care will have a positive effect on 
knowledge-intensive industrial agglomerations and thus on private-sector productivity.  
Conversely, if local governments try to attract highly educated people to a region by 
establishing more public jobs for such people, they will fail.  More public jobs for highly 
skilled workers will lower their wage and thus make it less attractive for such individuals to 
move to a region. 
 
The reason in both cases is that the first-order effect of public sector resource use on the 
private sector is a Rybczynski effect (Rybczynski (1955)).  If the government hires unskilled 
workers, and thus reduces the supply of such workers to the private sector, the effect will be a 
reduction in production and employment in low-skilled private firms and growth in 
production and employment in high-skilled industries.  Conversely, public-sector employment 
of highly skilled workers will have a negative effect on high-skilled private industry and a 
positive effect on low-skilled firms.  This first-order effect is magnified by industrial 
agglomeration forces, which also leads to effects on private-sector productivity. 
 
The model used in the paper has two factors of production, skilled and unskilled labour.  
These are used in three production sectors – one public and two private (a knowledge-
intensive and a sector which uses unskilled labour intensively).  There are constant returns to 
scale at the firm level4, but there are external economies of scale in the knowledge-intensive 
sector. 
 
In section 2 we develop the basic model.  Equilibrium conditions are derived in section 3.  In 
section 3 we also analyse how public sector production affects industrial structure in the 
private sector.  In section 4 we perform a welfare-analysis and discuss how the obtained 
                                                 
3 See e.g. St.meld nr 17 (2002-2003), p 17 
4 This implicitly assumes that other factors, such as capital, are freely traded at a fixed price and thus can be 
netted out. 
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results should be implemented in cost-benefit analyses of public goods provision.  Possible 
extensions are pointed out in section 5.  Section 6 provides a brief summary. 
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2. The basic model 
 
We consider a small, open economy in which there are three sectors of production: Two 
private and a public sector.       
 
There are two factors of production - skilled and unskilled labour5.  Every inhabitant is a 
worker and each worker (whether skilled or unskilled) inelastically supplies one unit of 
labour.  Total labour supply thus equals the total number of inhabitants in the economy and 
regional labour supply equals the total number of inhabitants in a region.   
 
Firms in the private industries produce homogenous consumption goods sold in perfectly 
competitive world markets at given prices.  One of the industries is knowledge-intensive and 
experiences external economies of scale (see e.g. Audretsch and Feldman (1996) for the 
importance of external economies in knowledge-intensive industries and Ottaviano and Puga 
(1998) or Fujita and Thisse (2002) for overviews of the new economic geography literature).  
The other industry produces subject to constant returns to scale at both firm and industry 
levels.         
 
In the public sector, locally consumed goods and services are produced.   
 
Our main question is: How does public sector production affect the private sector; in 
particular, the industrial structure, the size and the productivity in the private sector? 
 
2.1. The private sector 
 
In the private sector there are two industries, each composed of a large number of firms.  We 
label the two industries 1 and 2.  Firms in both industries produce homogenous consumption 
goods with constant returns to scale at the firm level.  There are two factors of production - 
skilled and unskilled labour.  The two industries differ in their skill-intensiveness6 of 
production, with industry 1 being the most skill-intensive industry.  In the skill-intensive 
industry 1 there are external economies of scale in production.   
                                                 
5 We assume that unskilled workers cannot become skilled or vice versa. 
6 We use the terms skill-intensive and knowledge-intensive interchangeably 
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Total production in industry 1, 1x , is given by the aggregate production function 
 
(1) ),()( 1111
us llxx αϕ= , 
 
where 
sl1  and 
ul1  are the numbers of skilled and unskilled labour, respectively, used to 
produce good 1.  )( 1xϕ  captures the external economies of scale.  It is an increasing and 
concave function; 0)(,0)( 11 <′′>′ xx ϕϕ . 
 
Total production of good 2, 2x , is given by the aggregate production function   
 
 (2) ),( 222
us llx β= . 
 
Both ( )us ll 11 ,α  and ( )us ll 22 ,β  inhibit constant returns to scale.   
   
To simplify the model we assume fixed coefficients in the production of each good, and let 
the aggregate production functions be 
 
(3) ),min()( 111111
uuss lAlAxx ϕ= , 
 
 (4) ),min( 22222
uuss lAlAx = , 
 
where jiA  are constants, usji ,;2,1 ==  
 
Private sector demand for skilled and unskilled labour, sdl  and 
u
dl  follows as 
 
(5) 22111 )( xaxaxl
sss
d += γ , 
 
 (6) 22111)( xaxaxl
uuu
d += γ ; j
i
j
i A
a 1≡ ; 
)(
1)(
1
1 x
x ϕγ ≡ ; 2,1=i ; usj ,=  
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Let sl  and ul  be the supplies of skilled and unskilled labour facing firms in the private sector.  
Equality of labour supply and private sector labour demand is given by 
 
(7) 22111)( xaxaxl
sss += γ , 
 
(8) 22111 )( xaxaxl
uuu += γ . 
 
Skilled and unskilled labour are the only factors of production, and so total costs of producing 
good i are 
 
(9) ui
us
i
s
i lwlwTC += , 
 
where sw  and uw  are the wage rates of skilled and unskilled labour, respectively. 
 
Define unit costs of a single firm as 
 
(10) uui
ss
i
us
i wawawwb +≡),( ; i=1,2. 
 
Unit costs of the entire industries are 
 
(11) ),()( 11
us wwbxγ , 
 
(12) ),(2
us wwb  
 
for industry 1 and 2 respectively. 
 
Private firms sell their goods in perfectly competitive world markets with no trade costs.  
Each firm equates marginal cost to the prevailing market price of the good.  There are 
constant returns to scale at the firm level and hence marginal cost equals unit cost.  Equilibria 
in the goods markets are therefore given by  
 
(13) 111 ),()( pwwbx
us =γ , 
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(14) 22 ),( pwwb
us = , 
 
i.e. unit costs equal the prices of the goods, where ip  is the price of good i. 
 
2.2. The public sector 
 
In the public sector locally consumed goods and services are produced by skilled and 
unskilled labour.  The production process is subject to constant returns to scale.  We assume 
constant coefficients in the production process.   
Public sector labour demand is  
 
(15) gal sg
s
g = , 
 
(16) gal ug
u
g = , 
 
where g is the amount of publicly produced goods and services.  The amount of publicly 
produced goods and services, g, is determined by local governments, and the size of g 
indirectly determines public sector employment, sgl  and 
u
gl . 
 
The supplies of skilled and unskilled labour facing firms in the private sector are 
 
(17) ganl sg
ss −= , 
 
(18) ganl ug
uu −= . 
 
sn  and un  denote the total supplies of skilled and unskilled labour in the economy.   
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3. Equilibrium 
 
General equilibrium obtains when labour and goods markets clear. 
 
Labour markets clear when equations (7), (8), (15) and (16) hold.  Equations (15) and (16) 
show how much labour the public sector needs in order to be able to produce the desired 
amount of public goods.    Equations (7) and (8) give the conditions for private sector labour 
market equilibria (i.e. private firms’ labour demand equals the labour supply facing private 
firms).   
 
Goods market equilibrium is obtained when equations (13) and (14) hold. 
 
We perform a two-fold general equilibrium analysis.  First, we assume that there is no produc-
tion in the public sector.  This is done so that we may establish the basic general equilibrium 
conditions.  Thereafter, we introduce public goods production in order to study the effects of 
public sector production on the productivity and production structure in the private sector.   
 
3.1. Equilibrium with no public sector activity 
 
With no public sector activity, there are firms in two industries producing homogenous 
consumption goods sold in perfectly competitive world markets.  General equilibrium 
requires that the markets for skilled and unskilled labour clear (as given by equations (7) and 
(8)), and that the goods markets clear (as given by equations (13) and (14)).   
 
Labour supplies are fixed and with no public sector production the supplies of skilled and 
unskilled workers facing private firms equal the total number of skilled and unskilled workers 
in the economy, sl  equals sn  and ul  equals un .  We may then solve equations (7) and (8) to 
find the volumes of private goods production 
 
(19)  22111 )( xaxaxn
sss += γ  and 22111 )( xaxaxn uuu += γ  ⇒  )ˆ,ˆ( 21 xx .   
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Goods markets equilibria are given by equations (13) and (14).  Inserting for the volumes of 
private goods production from (19) we solve these to find the wage rates of skilled and 
unskilled labour 
 
(20) 111 ),()( pwwbx
us =γ  and 22 ),( pwwb us =  ⇒  ( ) usjxppw j ,;ˆ,, 121 = . 
 
The equilibrium conditions are illustrated in figures 3 and 4.  
 
Figure 3: Equilibrium wage rates 
 
In figure 3 we measure the wage rate of skilled workers along the horizontal axis and the 
wage rate of unskilled workers along the vertical axis.  The curves illustrate the conditions for 
goods market equilibrium; i.e. unit costs equal goods prices.  The slope of the unit cost 
contour of industry i is )( si
u
i AA− .  (The unit cost contours are straight lines due to the 
assumption of fixed coefficients in production).  Equilibrium wage rates, swˆ  and uwˆ , are 
found at the intersection of the two curves. 
   
The location of the unit cost contour of industry 1 depends upon the size of the industry.  This 
contrasts standard Heckscher-Ohlin models and is due to the assumption of external 
economies of scale in the industry; the larger the industry, the higher the productivity.  Thus, 
unit costs of the industry as a whole decreases with the size of the industry.  The unit cost 
contour of industry 1 moves to the north-east with increased industry 1 production.  We see 
uw
( ) 111 pbx =γ
2
2 pb =  
swˆ
uwˆ  
sw  
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that the wage rate of skilled labour is an increasing function of the volume of industry 1 
production, the wage rate of unskilled labour is a decreasing one.   
 
Figure 4: Production structure 
 
In figure 4 we measure the number of skilled workers along the horizontal axis and the 
number of unskilled workers along the vertical.  The curves show the labour input 
requirements of the two industries.  Total labour supply is given by (the point) N.  Industry 1 
employs  sl1ˆ  number of skilled workers and 
ul1ˆ  number of unskilled workers.  Industry 2 
employs sl2ˆ  number of skilled workers and 
ul2ˆ  number of unskilled workers.  The size of the 
two industries (volume of production) follows from the levels of employment.   
 
3.2. Equilibrium with public sector production 
 
In the public sector locally consumed goods are produced by skilled and unskilled labour.  We 
start the analysis by taking the amount of public goods production, g, to be fixed.  I.e. we do 
not consider how the amount of publicly produced goods and services is determined.  Public 
sector labour employment is then given by the volume of public goods production (the size of 
g).  We will return to the question of optimal public goods supply in section 4.  Compared to 
the analysis of section 2.1, the labour supply facing firms in the private sector is reduced by 
the level of public sector employment.   
N 
Industry1 
Industry 2 
 ul 2ˆ
ul1ˆ  
un
sn
ul  
sl1ˆ  
sl2ˆ  
sl  
sl  
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Our aim is to study how the structure of production and factor payments (which follow factor 
productivity) in the private sector are affected by the use of resources for public goods 
production.   
 
3.2.1. Production structure effects 
 
In order to make the analysis as simple as possible, we define a new variable, 1z , defined as  
 
(21) 111 )( xxz γ≡ ,  
 
1z  shows industry 1 production adjusted for the external economies, i.e. how much firms in 
industry 1 would have produced if the industry had not experienced external economies of 
scale.   
 
Inserting for 1z  into the equations for labour market equilibrium, equations (7) and (8), gives 
us 
 
(22) 2211 xazal
sss += , 
 
(23) 2211 xazal
uuu += . 
 
Manipulating (22) and (23) allow us to express 1z  in terms of production coefficients and 
labour supply in the private sector 
 
(24) ( )suus lala
D
z 221
1 −= ; 02121 <−≡ ussu aaaaD . 
 
Differentiating (24) with respect to g gives 
 
(25) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −= u
s
u
g
s
guu
g a
a
a
a
aa
Ddg
dz
2
2
2
1 1 . 
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Whether ( )dgdz1  is positive or negative depends on the skill-intensity in public goods 
production compared to the skill-intensity in industry 2 production (the least skill-intensive 
private industry) 
 
(26) 01 >
dg
dz  iff u
s
u
g
s
g
a
a
a
a
2
2<
 
 
(27) 01 <
dg
dz  iff u
s
u
g
s
g
a
a
a
a
2
2> . 
 
Next, we differentiate 1z  as given by its definition in equation (21) with respect to the amount 
of public goods production, g:  
 
(28) ( )
dg
dxx
dg
dz 1
1
1 γγ ′+= , 
 
which gives 
 
(29) ( )1
1
1 1 x
dg
dzdg
dx γγ ′+
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=
 
 
The sign of ( )dgdx1  is equal to the sign of ( )dgdz1 :  
 
(30) 01 >
dg
dx  iff u
s
u
g
s
g
a
a
a
a
2
2<
 
 
(31) 01 <
dg
dx  iff u
s
u
g
s
g
a
a
a
a
2
2> .  
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The size of industry 1 is an increasing function of the volume of public goods production if 
and only if public goods production is less knowledge-intensive than industry 2 production. 
 
This is the Rybczynski effect.  If public goods production is less skill-intensive than produc-
tion in industry 2, increased public goods production leads to increased relative supply of 
highly skilled labour to private firms.  The increased relative supply of highly skilled labour 
leads to increased production in the knowledge-intensive industry, as predicted by the 
Rybczynski theorem.   
 
The effect of public goods production on the size of industry 2 is found by performing the 
same kind of mathematical reasoning as done through equations (22) to (31).  This leads to 
the following results  
 
(32) 02 >
dg
dx  iff u
s
u
g
s
g
a
a
a
a
1
1>
 
 
(33) 02 <
dg
dx  iff u
s
u
g
s
g
a
a
a
a
1
1< . 
 
The size of industry 2 is an increasing function of the volume of public goods production if 
and only if public goods production is more skill-intensive than the production process in the 
most skill-intensive private industry.  The Rybczynski effect once again.     
 
When we combine the results given by equations (30) to (33), and bear in mind that industry 1 
is more skill-intensive than industry 2, we are left with three possible outcomes regarding the 
impact of public goods production on the production structure of the private sector, depending 
on the knowledge-intensity in public sector production. 
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Case 1: Public goods production is the least knowledge-intensive production process 
If production of public goods is the least knowledge-intensive production process, increasing 
these activities leads to increased production in industry 1 and decreased production in 
industry 2.   
 
(34) u
g
s
g
u
s
u
s
a
a
a
a
a
a >>
2
2
1
1   ⇒   01 >
dg
dx , 02 <
dg
dx . 
 
The effects are illustrated in figure 5.  Total labour supply is given by N, which, with no 
public goods production, is allocated between the two private industries as illustrated in figure 
4.  With public sector production, the labour supply facing private firms is reduced to N’ 
where the relative supply of unskilled labour facing private firms is reduced.  This leads to 
increased sector 1 production and decreased sector 2 production, as illustrated by the arrows.  
 
 
 
Figure 5: Production structure effects when public sector production is the least skill-
intensive 
 
 
 
 
N 
Industry 1 
Industry 2 
  
 
 
Public goods 
sl  
ul  
N ′  
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Case 2: Balanced knowledge-intensity in public sector production  
If public sector production is neither extremely skill-intensive nor extremely intensive in the 
use of unskilled labour, then increasing public goods production leads to an overall reduction 
in private sector activities: 
 
(35) u
s
u
g
s
g
u
s
a
a
a
a
a
a
2
2
1
1 >>   ⇒   01 <
dg
dx , 02 <
dg
dx . 
 
This effect is illustrated in figure 6. 
 
  
 
Figure 6: Production structure effects with balanced knowledge-intensity in public goods 
production 
 
 
 
 
 
N 
Industry 1 
Industry 2 
 
N ′  
Public goods
 
sl  
ul  
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Case 3: Public sector production is the most skill-intensive production process 
Finally, if public sector production is the most knowledge-intensive production process, 
increased public goods production leads to a smaller knowledge-intensive and a larger 
unskilled-intensive private industry: 
 
(36) u
s
u
s
u
g
s
g
a
a
a
a
a
a
2
2
1
1 >>   ⇒   01 <
dg
dx , 02 >
dg
dx . 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Production structure effects when public sector production is knowledge-intensive 
 
To find the equilibrium wage rates we insert for unit costs into equation (13) and (14), and get 
 
(37) [ ] 1111 )( pawawx uuss =+γ  , 
 
(38) [ ] 222 pawaw uuss =+ . 
  
N 
Industry 1 
Industry 2 
  
 Public goods
 
N ′
sl  
ul  
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Manipulating equations (37) and (38) yields the following expression for the wage rate of 
skilled labour 
 
(39) ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −= uus a
p
xa
p
E
w
1
1
12
2
)(
11
γ ;   
 
Where E is defined as the difference between the knowledge-intensiveness in production of 
the private goods; 
 
0
1
1
2
2 <−≡ u
s
u
s
a
a
a
aE
. 
 
Differentiating equation (39) with respect to public sector production, g, yields  
 
(40) ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ′=
dg
dx
a
p
Edg
dw
u
s
1
1
1
2
11 γγ . 
 
We see that 
 
(41) 0>
dg
dws  iff 01 >
dg
dx
 
 
The wage rate of skilled labour is an increasing function of the amount of public goods 
production if and only if the size of the knowledge-intensive industry increases with increased 
public goods production. This is due to the agglomeration gains.  As the knowledge-intensive 
industry grows, so does productivity and hence payments to the factor used intensively in 
production – namely highly skilled labour. 
 
(42) 0<
dg
dws  iff 01 <
dg
dx . 
 
Conversely, if the size of the knowledge-intensive industry 1 declines as public goods 
production increases, the wage rate of skilled labour also declines. 
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From equations (37) and (38) we find the wage rate of unskilled labour 
 
(43) ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −= ssu a
p
xa
p
xF
w
1
1
12
2
1 )(
1
)(
1
γ  
 
where )( 1xF  is defined as  
 
 0
)(
1)(
1
1
12
2
1 >−≡ s
u
s
u
a
a
xa
axF γ .   
 
In order to find the effect of public goods production on the wage rate of unskilled labour, we 
differentiate equation (43) with respect to g, 
 
(44) ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ′′−=
dg
dx
a
p
F
F
dg
dw
s
u
1
1
1
23
1 γγ ;  dg
dx
a
aF s
u
1
1
1
2
1 γγ ′=′ , 
 
and find 
 
(45) 0>
dg
dwu  iff 01 <
dg
dx , 
 
(46) 0<
dg
dwu  iff 01 >
dg
dx . 
 
Combining the results of equations (41), (42), (45) and (46), we find the total effect of public 
goods production on the wage rates.  Two possibilities arise: Either the wage rate of skilled 
labour increases and the wage rate of unskilled decreases.  This happens if public goods 
production leads to increased production in the skill-intensive industry.  Or the wage rate of 
skilled workers decreases and the wage rate of unskilled workers increases.  This is the case if 
increased public goods production leads to lower production in the skill-intensive private 
industry.   
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3.2.2 Wage effects 
 
As we have seen, the use of resources in the public sector affects not only production 
structures but also factor payments.  To find the link between knowledge-intensiveness of 
production and the wage effects we combine the above result with equations (34), (35) and 
(36), resulting in 
 
(47) u
g
s
g
u
s
u
s
a
a
a
a
a
a >>
2
2
1
1   ⇒   0>
dg
dws , 0<
dg
dwu
 
 
(48) u
s
u
g
s
g
u
s
a
a
a
a
a
a
2
2
1
1 >> ∨
  
u
s
u
s
u
g
s
g
a
a
a
a
a
a
2
2
1
1 >>   ⇒   0<
dg
dws , 0>
dg
dwu .
 
 
If and only if the production process in the public sector is the least skill-intensive of all 
production processes does an increase in public goods production lead to increased wages of 
skilled labour – as shown by equation (47).  Otherwise, public sector activities will lead to 
reduced wage rates of highly skilled labour and increased wage rates of low-skilled labour – 
as shown by equation (48). 
 
The two possibilities of public goods production on the wage rates are illustrated in figures 8 
and 9.  We measure the wage rate of skilled labour along the vertical axis and the wage rate of 
unskilled labour along the horizontal axis.  The unit cost contours of industries 1 and 2 are 
drawn. 
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Figure 8 shows the situation in which public goods production leads to increased production 
in the skill-intensive industry 1.  Public goods production is the least skill-intensive of all 
production processes.  As the volume of industry 1 production goes up, so does the pro-
ductivity in the industry.  The increased productivity moves the unit cost contour to the north-
east, leading to an increase in the wage rate of skilled labour and a decrease in the wage rate 
of unskilled labour. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Wage effects of public sector production which is intensive in the use of unskilled 
labour 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
( ) 111 pbx =γ
2
2 pb =
swˆ
uwˆ  
sw  
uw  
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Figure 9 illustrates the case in which public goods production leads to a smaller skill-intensive 
industry 1; which is the case whenever public goods production is more skill-intensive than 
the least skill-intensive of the private industries.  The productivity of industry 1 declines as 
the volume of production in the industry declines.  This leads to a movement of the unit cost 
contour to the south-west.  The wage rate of skilled labour goes down and the wage rate of 
unskilled labour goes up.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Wage effects of skill-intensive public sector production 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
uw
( ) 111 pbx =γ
2
2 pb =
swˆ
uwˆ  
sw  
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4. Utility and welfare 
 
Utility derives from the consumption of private and public goods.  The utility of individual k 
is a function of the amounts consumed of the two private goods and the provision of public 
goods.  We assume that everyone shares the same utility function.  The utility of individual k 
is 
 
(49) ( )gccU kkk ,, 21= , 
 
where kic  is individual k’s consumption of good i. 
 
Individuals make optimising choices regarding the consumption of private goods.  Utility can 
therefore be expressed by the indirect utility function  
 
(50) ( ) ( ) 0;0);( <″>′+= kkkkk ffgfyV  
 
Preferences are assumed to be quasi-linear.  ( )gf k  is the utility person k gets from consum-
ing public goods.  Labour income is assumed to be the only source of income, and ky is the 
income net of taxes of individual k.  We do not consider the question of how public goods 
production could or should be financed, but simply assume that it is financed through a 
lumpsum tax.   
 
The optimal amount of public sector production depends on whether the goods produced are 
pure public goods or publicly provided private goods.  In the following analysis we will 
assume that the goods are pure public goods with no rivalry in consumption, and in chapter 4 
briefly discuss how the results would be altered if the goods produced in the public sector 
were private goods. 
 
Welfare is the sum of all individuals’ utility 
 
(51) ∑∑∑
===
≡+==
n
k
k
n
k
k
n
k
k yygfyVW
111
;)(    . 
25 
 
 
Finding the optimal amount of public goods production amounts to choosing the g which 
maximises equation (51)  
 
(52)  ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ += ∑
=
n
k
k
gg
gfyW
1
)(maxmax . 
 
The sum of all individuals’ labour income must equal the value of production in the private 
sector,  
 
(53) 2211 xpxpy += . 
 
Differentiating y with respect to g gives 
 
(54) 
dg
dxp
dg
dxp
dg
dy 2
2
1
1 +=
.
 
 
Equilibrium wage rates of skilled and unskilled labour equals the value of the marginal 
product of skilled and unskilled labour, respectively.  From equations (1) and (2) we therefore 
know that 
 
(55) s
s
s pwp βαϕ ′==′ 21 , 
 
(56) u
u
u pwp βαϕ ′==′ 21 , 
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From equation (1) we also find how the production of goods in the knowledge-intensive 
sector is affected by public goods production, 
 
(57)  
dg
dl
dg
dl
dg
dx
dg
dx u
u
s
s
1111 αϕαϕϕα ′+′+′=
, 
 
which gives 
 
(58) ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
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⎛
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dl
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u
s
s
111
1
1 αϕαϕϕα . 
 
Similarly, from equation (2) we find how the production of goods in industry 2 is affected by 
public goods production, 
 
(59) 
dg
dl
dg
dl
dg
dx u
u
s
s
222 ββ ′+′= . 
 
Inserting from equations (55), (56), (58) and (59) into (54) gives 
 
(60) ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
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⎛
′−
′+⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ ++⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +=
dg
dl
p
dg
dl
p
dg
dl
dg
dl
w
dg
dl
dg
dl
w
dg
dy u
u
s
s
uu
u
ss
s 1
1
1
1
2121
1
αϕαϕϕα
ϕα .
 
 
The total reduction in private sector labour employment must equal the increased employment 
in the public sector, 
 
(61)
 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +−=
dg
dl
dg
dl
dg
dl sssg 21
, 
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(62) 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +−=
dg
dl
dg
dl
dg
dl uuug 21
.
 
 
Inserting from (61) and (62) into equation (60) gives 
 
(63) ⎪⎭
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The term in the last parenthesis equals ( )dgdxp 11 , i.e. the value of the production effects in 
the knowledge-intensive industry of increased public goods production.  Using this fact, we 
finally arrive at 
 
(64) 
dg
dx
p
dg
dl
w
dg
dl
w
dg
dy ugu
s
gs 1
1 ϕα ′+⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ +−=
 
 
 
Equation (64) shows the marginal cost of public goods production, defined as the amount of 
foregone consumption of private goods.  Total marginal cost is the sum of the direct costs and 
the indirect costs or cost reductions induced by production of public goods.  The direct costs 
are the wage costs, as shown by the term in parenthesis.  The indirect effects on marginal 
costs arise because of the productivity effects public goods production exert on the private 
sector.  Marginal costs rise if public goods production leads to a smaller knowledge-intensive 
sector.  Whereas they fall if the knowledge-intensive sector grows as public goods production 
does so.  The indirect effect is given by the last term of equation (64).    
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Now, return to the welfare maximisation problem of equation (52).   
The optimal supply of public goods is such that 
 
(65) ∑
=
′=−⇒=
n
k
kf
dg
dy
dg
dW
1
0
 
 
Equation (65) states the (obvious) condition that the optimal g is such that the total marginal 
cost of public goods production equals the sum of marginal utilities of public goods 
consumption. 
 
Inserting for ( )dgdy  equation (65) becomes 
 
(66) ∑
=
′=′−
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ +
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1ϕα
,  
 
which is a modified version of the Samuelson rule (Samuelson (1954)).  It states that the 
optimal supply of public goods is such that marginal cost equals the aggregate marginal 
willingness to pay.  Marginal costs are, however, modified to include the indirect costs caused 
by external economies.  
 
The implications for optimal public goods supply follow: If public goods production leads to 
decreased productivity in the private sector (the case if knowledge-intensive production is 
reduced), then the optimal supply of public goods is smaller than in a situation where public 
goods production has no productivity effect in the private sector.  If, on the other hand, public 
goods production enhances private sector productivity, then optimal public goods supply is 
larger.      
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5. Possible extensions  
 
The model we have developed is a very simplified model.  In this chapter we point to some 
possible extensions and discuss one of these in more detail.   
 
In the model there are two factors of production – skilled and unskilled labour.  An obvious 
extension would be to add one or more factors of production, e.g. capital.  We have also 
assumed that local public goods are consumption goods.  Many local public goods do, 
however, have direct or indirect production effects, either because the goods are used directly 
in the production processes of private firms or because they influence the productivity of 
other production factors.  Analysing the case in which the public goods are production goods 
would be another possible extension of the model.  Finally, we have assumed that labour is 
immobile between communities.  We now briefly discuss how the results are modified when 
we allow for migration; i.e. when labour is mobile between communities.   
 
Take the presented model as a starting point, but assume that highly skilled workers are 
mobile between communities.  The supply of highly skilled labour in a community depends 
on the utility these workers get when living in that specific community as compared to living 
in other communities.  Utility is a function of the consumption of local public goods and the 
consumption of private goods.  The consumption of private goods depends on income/the 
wage rate, and so utility is a function of the local public goods supply and the regional wage 
rate, 
 
(67) ( )gwUU sss ,= . 
 
The supply of highly skilled labour in a community, which depends on the difference in utility 
from living in the specific region compared to living in other regions, may then be written as a 
function of the regional wage rate and the supply of local public goods: 
 
(68) ( )gwnn sss ,= ;  
 
where 0>swn  and 0>sgn . 
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In order to attract more knowledge-intensive clusters, local governments have one policy 
instrument, namely the provision of local public goods.  Increased local public goods supply 
makes the community more attractive as a place to live, and by doing this governments can 
attract more highly skilled labour.  The change in utility of a highly skilled worker that results 
from increased public goods supply is 
 
(69) sg
s
s
w
s
U
dg
dwU
dg
dU +=  
 
The first term shows the indirect effect that results because productivity and hence wages are 
affected.  The second term is the direct effect on utility of higher public goods consumption.  
The optimal supply of local public goods is such that a small increase in local public goods 
supply will not alter the utility directly, and so the optimum is characterised by 
 
(70) 0=sgU  
 
Inserting into equation (69) gives 
 
(71) 
dg
dwU
dg
dU ss
w
s
=  
 
The only effect on utility is the indirect effect which results because wages, and hence private 
goods consumption, are affected.  This means that the results obtained earlier are reinforced. 
 
Assume that public goods production is extremely knowledge-intensive.  Then increased 
public goods production leads to lower wages of highly skilled labour because the 
productivity in knowledge-intensive private industries falls.  The utility of highly skilled 
workers decreases and some of these will therefore migrate.  The total supply of highly skilled 
labour facing firms in the private industry is further reduced.   
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Figure 10: Wage and employment effects of increased public goods production in knowledge-
intensive sector when public goods production is knowledge-intensive. 
 
In figure 10 we have illustrated the demand for and supply of highly skilled labour to the 
knowledge-intensive industry.  Demand is an upward-sloping curve due to the agglomeration 
effects.  sl1ˆ   is the initial level of employment with the corresponding wage rate 
sw0  .  If local 
governments decide on increasing public goods production, the supply of highly skilled 
labour facing the knowledge-intensive industry is reduced to sl1  .  The difference between 
sl1ˆ  
and sl1  equals the increased need for highly skilled labour in the public sector.  If labour 
supply is given, i.e. labour is immobile, this reduces the wage rate of skilled labour to sw2 .  
But when skilled workers are mobile such a reduction in the wage rate induces migration, and 
so the supply of highly skilled labour is further reduced, as indicated by the shift of the supply 
curve (from the initial to the final supply curve).  The wage rate of highly skilled labour 
declines further to sw1 .   
 
 
 
Demand  
sl1ˆ  
sl1  
sl  
w  Initial supply Final supply 
sw2  
sw1  
sw0
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6. Summary 
 
In this paper we address the question: How does the use of resources in the public sector 
affect private goods production, i.e. how does it affect the production structure and 
productivity?  We analyse these questions in a setting where there are gains from geographic 
agglomeration in knowledge-intensive private industries. 
 
We find that the effect on the production structure is a pure Rybczynski effect: If production 
of public goods requires much highly skilled labour, then the production of public goods will 
come at the expense of production of knowledge-intensive private goods.  The size of 
knowledge-intensive clusters in the private sector are reduced.  Due to agglomeration effects, 
the effect on productivity works in the same direction.  As the knowledge-intensive industry 
declines, productivity also declines because the agglomeration gains cannot be exploited to 
the same degree.  The lower productivity is reflected in factor payments; the wage rate of 
highly skilled labour goes down.   
 
The fact that production of public goods affects productivity in the private sector has 
implications for the optimal supply of public goods.  The Samuelson rule for optimal supply 
of public goods – marginal costs equals the sum of marginal utilities of public goods – still 
applies, but the marginal costs of public goods must be modified to account for the 
productivity costs or gains.  
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